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How do we determine whether individuals accept the actual consistency of a political argument instead of just its rhetorical good looks? This article answers this question by proposing an interpretation of political argument within the constraints of political liberalism. It utilises modern developments in the philosophy of logic and language to reclaim 'meaningless nonsense' from use as a partisan war cry and to build up political argument as something more than a power struggle between competing conceptions of the good. Standard solutions for 'clarifying' meaning through descriptive definition encounter difficulties with the biases of status quo idioms (long noted by theorists like William Connolly and Quentin Skinner), as well as partisan translations and circularity. Collectively called linguistic gerrymandering, these difficulties threaten political liberalism's underlying coherency. The proposed interpretation of political argument overcomes this with a new brand of conceptual analysis that can falsifiably determine whether rhetoric has hijacked political argument.

Works through a number of debates about the nature of right, law, autonomy, utility, freedom, virtue, and justice. Argues that political theorists frequently think in terms of gross concepts: they reduce what are actually relational claims to claims about one or another of components of the relation. Offers a pair of explanations for why gross concepts persist in political theory, and suggest a way for avoiding their trap. (JLN)

POLITICAL THEORISTS OFTEN fail to appreciate that any claim about how politics is to be organized must be a relational claim involving agents, actions, legitimacy, and ends. If they did, they would see that to defend the standard contending views in many of the controversies that occupy them is silly. In what follows I work through a number of debates about the nature of right, law, autonomy, utility, freedom, virtue, and justice, showing this to be true. I argue, further, that political theorists frequently think in terms of gross concepts: They reduce what are actually relational claims to claims about one or another of the components of the relation. This not only obscures the phenomena they wish to analyze, it also generates debates that can never be resolved because the alternatives that are opposed to one another are vulnerable within their own terms. Finally I offer a pair of explanations for why gross concepts persist in political theory, and suggest a way for avoiding their trap.

In this essay, the author examines the tensions that emerge between the practice of essay writing and a commitment to philosophical justification as themodel for political argument in contemporary political thought. He focuses on Jürgen Habermas's adoption of the performative contradiction as an ideal for communicative exchange and shows the unacknowledged role that sincerity plays in Habermas's argument. He then links this account to his explorations of the rise of aesthetic criticism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its contribution to democratic thought. Turning to one of the key literary and political critics of the period, William Hazlitt, the author shows how his theory of essay composition lends itself to a radical democratic imaginary that complicates the account of political argument Habermas sets out. Hazlitt's essays, the author concludes, are exemplary in their embracing of contradiction as a condition of democratic life.